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=Stale / Rejected Efforts=
 
=Stale / Rejected Efforts=
* Neimod has been working on a RAM dumping setup for a little while now. He's de-soldered the 3DS's RAM chip and hooked it and the RAM pinouts on the 3DS' PCB up to a custom RAM dumping setup. A while ago he published photos showing his setup to be working quite well, with the 3DS successfully booting up. However, his flickr stream is now private along with most of his work.
+
* In the early days of 3DS hacking, Neimod was working on a RAM dumping setup for a while. He has de-soldered the 3DS's RAM chip and hooked it and the RAM pinouts on the 3DS' PCB up to a custom RAM dumping setup. He ''has'' published photos showing his setup to be working quite well, with the 3DS successfully booting up, but however, his flickr stream is now private along with most of his work and this method has been unreleased. RAM dumping can be done through homebrew now, making this method obsolete regardless.
 
  −
* Someone (who will remain unnamed) has released CFW and CIA installers, all of which is copied from the work of others, or copyrighted material.
      
==Tips and info==
 
==Tips and info==
Line 74: Line 72:  
| February 2015
 
| February 2015
 
| [[User:Yellows8|Yellows8]], [[User:Plutooo|plutoo]]
 
| [[User:Yellows8|Yellows8]], [[User:Plutooo|plutoo]]
|-
  −
| FIRM partitions known-plaintext
  −
| The [[Flash_Filesystem|FIRM partitions]] are encrypted with AES-CTR without a MAC. Since this works by XOR'ing data with a static (per-console in this case) keystream, one can deduce the keystream of a portion of each FIRM partition if they have the actual FIRM binary stored in it.
  −
  −
This can be paired with many exploits. For example, it allows minor FIRM downgrades (i.e. 10.4 to 9.6 or 9.5 to 9.4, but not 9.6 to 9.5).
  −
  −
This can be somewhat addressed by having a FIRM header skip over previously used section offsets, but this would just air-gap newer FIRMs without fixing the core bug. This can also only be done a limited number of times due to the size of FIRM versus the size of the partitions.
  −
| None
  −
| New3DS
  −
|
  −
| Everyone
   
|-
 
|-
 
| RSA keyslots don't clear exponent when setting modulus
 
| RSA keyslots don't clear exponent when setting modulus
Line 98: Line 85:  
| March 2016
 
| March 2016
 
| [[User:Myria|Myria]]
 
| [[User:Myria|Myria]]
 +
|-
 +
| [[CONFIG11_Registers#CFG11_GPUPROT|CFG11_GPUPROT]] allowing acccess to AXIWRAM/FCRAM-BASE-memregion
 +
| [[CONFIG11_Registers#CFG11_GPUPROT|CFG11_GPUPROT]] can be configured by anything with access to it to allow the GPU to access the entire AXIWRAM+FCRAM. For example, this is an issue for any sysmodule that gets exploited and has access to this register memory-page(include one that's listed below).
 +
 +
See also "kernelhax via gspwn" below.
 +
| None
 +
| New3DS
 +
| February 7, 2017
 +
| [[User:Yellows8|Yellows8]]
 +
|}
 +
 +
== Boot ROM ==
 +
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
 +
!  Summary
 +
!  Description
 +
!  Fixed with hardware model/revision
 +
!  Newest hardware model/revision this flaw was checked for
 +
!  Timeframe this was discovered
 +
!  Discovered by
 +
|-
 +
| FIRM partitions known-plaintext
 +
| The [[Flash_Filesystem|FIRM partitions]] are encrypted with AES-CTR without a MAC. Since this works by XOR'ing data with a static (per-console in this case) keystream, one can deduce the keystream of a portion of each FIRM partition if they have the actual FIRM binary stored in it.
 +
 +
This can be paired with many exploits. For example, it allows minor FIRM downgrades (i.e. 10.4 to 9.6 or 9.5 to 9.4, but not 9.6 to 9.5).
 +
However it is most commonly used to install arbitrary FIRMs (usually boot9strap), thanks to sighax.
 +
 +
This can be somewhat addressed by having a FIRM header skip over previously used section offsets, but this would just air-gap newer FIRMs without fixing the core bug. This can also only be done a limited number of times due to the size of FIRM versus the size of the partitions.
 +
| None
 +
| New3DS
 +
|
 +
| Everyone
 
|-
 
|-
 
| Boot9 AES keyinit function issues
 
| Boot9 AES keyinit function issues
Line 105: Line 123:  
| 2015
 
| 2015
 
| [[User:Yellows8|Yellows8]]
 
| [[User:Yellows8|Yellows8]]
 +
|-
 +
| New3DS has same boot ROM as Old3DS
 +
| The New3DS has the exact same boot ROM as the Old3DS.  This means, among other things, that all the same boot ROM flaws are present.  Also, this meant that it is possible to boot Old3DS firmware on New3DS (see "CFG9_SYSPROT9 bit1 not set by Kernel9").
 +
| None
 +
| New3DS
 +
| October 2014
 +
| Everyone
 +
|-
 +
| sighax: Boot9 improper validation of FIRM partition RSA signatures
 +
| The [[Flash_Filesystem|FIRM partitions]] are signed with RSA-2048 using SHA-256 and PKCS #1 v1.5 padding.  Boot9, however, improperly validates the padding in three ways:
 +
# Boot9 permits block type 02, meant for encrypted messages, to be used for signatures.  Only 01, for signatures, should have been permitted.  As a result, when using block type 02, a signature block is not required to have a long string of FF bytes as padding, but rather any nonzero random values suffice.
 +
# Boot9 does not require that the length of the padding fill out the signature block completely.  As a result, there is considerable freedom in the layout of a signature.
 +
# Boot9 fails to do bounds checking in its parsing of the DER-encoded hash algorithm type and hash value; the length values given in DER are permitted to point outside the signature block.
 +
Flaw 3 allows the DER encoding to be such that boot9 believes that the signature's hash value is outside the range of the block itself, somewhere on the stack.  This can be pointed at the correct hash value it computes.  Boot9 then memcmp's the calculated hash against itself, and thinks that the hash is valid.
 +
 +
As a result of the above, we estimate that one in 2<sup>43</sup> (~8.8 trillion) random fake signatures will be considered by Boot9 to be valid.  This is well within the range of brute force, particularly with an optimized GPU implementation.  An Nvidia GTX 1080 Ti would take about one week to find a match.
 +
| None
 +
| New3DS
 +
| July 2015
 +
| [[User:Derrek|derrek]]
 +
|-
 +
| Boot9 FIRM loading doesn't blacklist memory-mapped I/O
 +
| [[Bootloader|Boot9]]'s FIRM loading blacklists Boot9 data regions, but forgets to do other important regions, including Memory-mapped I/O. Combined with sighax, by loading a malicious FIRM section to MMIO, one can get Boot9/Boot11 code execution.
 +
| None
 +
| New3DS
 +
| 2015(?)
 +
| [[User:Derrek|derrek]] (2015?), [[User:Normmatt|Normmatt]] and [[User:SciresM|SciresM]] independently (January 2017).
 +
|-
 +
| "superhax": Boot9 FIRM loading blacklist check is flawed
 +
| Boot9 only makes sure the '''start''' and '''end''' address of each section is not covered by a blacklisted region. Thus, it is possible to overwrite blacklisted regions (e.g. ARM9 Exception Vectors) by choosing a FIRM section range that encloses an entire blacklisted region. The vulnerable code looks like this: if(blRegions[i].start <= sectionStart && blRegions[i].end > sectionStart <nowiki>||</nowiki> blRegions[i].start <= sectionEnd && blRegions[i].end > sectionEnd) return false; // failure
 +
| None
 +
| New3DS
 +
| August 2015
 +
| [[User:Plutoo|plutoo]], [[User:Yellows8|yellows8]]
 
|}
 
|}
   Line 140: Line 192:  
| arm9loaderhax given existing ARM9 code execution
 
| arm9loaderhax given existing ARM9 code execution
 
| None
 
| None
| [[11.2.0-35|11.2.0-X]]
+
| [[11.3.0-36|11.3.0-X]]
 
| Early 2016
 
| Early 2016
 
| 27 September 2016
 
| 27 September 2016
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| Derivation of all New3DS keys generated via the NAND keystore (0x1B "Secure4" etc.)
 
| Derivation of all New3DS keys generated via the NAND keystore (0x1B "Secure4" etc.)
 
| None
 
| None
| [[11.2.0-35|11.2.0-X]]
+
| [[11.3.0-36|11.3.0-X]]
 
| ~April 2015, implemented in May 2015
 
| ~April 2015, implemented in May 2015
 
| 13 January 2016
 
| 13 January 2016
Line 170: Line 222:  
| [[User:Yellows8|Yellows8]]
 
| [[User:Yellows8|Yellows8]]
 
|-
 
|-
| Missing verification-block for the 9.6 keys (arm9loaderhax)
+
| arm9loaderhax: Missing verification block for the 9.6 keys
 
| Starting with [[9.6.0-24|9.6.0-X]] a new set of NAND-based keys were introduced. However, no verification block was added to verify that the new key read from NAND is correct. This was technically an issue from [[9.5.0-22|9.5.0-X]] with the original sector+0 keydata, however the below is only possible with [[9.6.0-24|9.6.0-X]] since keyslots 0x15 and 0x16 are generated from different 0x11 keyXs.
 
| Starting with [[9.6.0-24|9.6.0-X]] a new set of NAND-based keys were introduced. However, no verification block was added to verify that the new key read from NAND is correct. This was technically an issue from [[9.5.0-22|9.5.0-X]] with the original sector+0 keydata, however the below is only possible with [[9.6.0-24|9.6.0-X]] since keyslots 0x15 and 0x16 are generated from different 0x11 keyXs.
   Line 182: Line 234:  
| Recovery of 6.x [[Savegames#6.0.0-11_Savegame_keyY|save key]]/7.x [[NCCH]] key, access to uncleared OTP hash keydata
 
| Recovery of 6.x [[Savegames#6.0.0-11_Savegame_keyY|save key]]/7.x [[NCCH]] key, access to uncleared OTP hash keydata
 
| None
 
| None
| [[11.2.0-35|11.2.0-X]]
+
| [[11.3.0-36|11.3.0-X]]
| March, 2015
+
| March 2015
 
|  
 
|  
 
| [[User:Plutooo|plutoo]]
 
| [[User:Plutooo|plutoo]]
 +
|-
 +
| arm9loader runs on Old3DS
 +
| Despite being written only for New3DS, all of arm9loader runs fine on Old3DS.  It's not until booting Kernel9 that a New3DS FIRM partition would crash on an Old3DS.  As a result, if a bug exists in arm9loader to get control, it can be exploited on Old3DS by writing New3DS FIRM to the FIRM partitions.  Thus, arm9loaderhax works on both Old3DS and New3DS.
 +
| arm9loader bugs also compromise Old3DS
 +
| None
 +
| [[11.3.0-36|11.3.0-X]]
 +
| Sometime in 2015
 +
|
 +
| [[User:Plutooo|plutoo]] presumably
 
|-
 
|-
 
| Uncleared New3DS keyslot 0x11
 
| Uncleared New3DS keyslot 0x11
Line 225: Line 286:  
| Leak of normal-key matching a key-generator key
 
| Leak of normal-key matching a key-generator key
 
| During the 3DS' development (June/July 2010) Nintendo added support installing encrypted content ([[CIA]]). Common-key index1 was intended to be a [[AES|hardware generated key]]. However while they added code to generate the key in hardware, they forgot to remove the normal-key for index1 (used elsewhere, likely old debug code). Nintendo later removed the normal key sometime before the first non-prototype firmware release.
 
| During the 3DS' development (June/July 2010) Nintendo added support installing encrypted content ([[CIA]]). Common-key index1 was intended to be a [[AES|hardware generated key]]. However while they added code to generate the key in hardware, they forgot to remove the normal-key for index1 (used elsewhere, likely old debug code). Nintendo later removed the normal key sometime before the first non-prototype firmware release.
      
Knowing the keyY and the normal-key for common-key index1, the devkit key-generator algorithm can be deduced (see "Hardware" above). Additionally the remaining devkit common-keys can be generated once the common-key keyX is recovered.
 
Knowing the keyY and the normal-key for common-key index1, the devkit key-generator algorithm can be deduced (see "Hardware" above). Additionally the remaining devkit common-keys can be generated once the common-key keyX is recovered.
   −
Note the devkit key-generator was discovered to be the same as the retail key-generator.
+
Note that the devkit key-generator was discovered to be the same as the retail key-generator.
 
| Deducing the keyX for keyslot 0x3D and hardware key-generator algorithm. Generate remaining devkit common-keys.
 
| Deducing the keyX for keyslot 0x3D and hardware key-generator algorithm. Generate remaining devkit common-keys.
 
| pre-[[1.0.0-0|1.0.0-X]]
 
| pre-[[1.0.0-0|1.0.0-X]]
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| January 20, 2016
 
| January 20, 2016
 
| [[User:Jakcron|jakcron]]
 
| [[User:Jakcron|jakcron]]
 +
|-
 +
| Factory firmware is vulnerable to sighax
 +
| During the 3DS's development, presumably boot9 was written (including the sighax vulnerability). This vulnerability is also present in factory firmware (and earlier, including 0.11). This was fixed in version 1.0.0-0.
 +
| Deducing the mechanics of the sighax vulnerability in boot9 without having a dump of protected boot9. ARM9 code execution on factory/earlier firmware.
 +
| [[1.0.0-0|1.0.0-X]]
 +
| [[1.0.0-0|1.0.0-X]]
 +
| May 9, 2017
 +
| May 19, 2017
 +
| [[User:SciresM|SciresM]], [[User:Myria|Myria]]
 +
|-
 +
| twlhax: Corrupted SRL header leads to memory overwrite
 +
| During TWL_FIRM boot, the ARM11 process TwlBg puts launcher.srl, the DSi bootloader, into FCRAM.  TWL_FIRM Process9 then parses the [http://dsibrew.org/wiki/NDS_Format SRL header] to place launcher.srl's code where DSi mode can execute it.
 +
 +
DSi-mode memory is in FCRAM, but interleaved.  Each byte of DSi-mode memory also exists at some address in 3DS FCRAM space.
 +
 +
Process9 does not validate the RSA signature on launcher.srl, unlike SRLs loaded from cartridge or NAND (DSiWare).  A compromised ARM11 can, in a manner similar to firmlaunchhax, send a launcher.srl with a modified SRL header.  By setting the SRL header's ARM7/ARM9 load addresses and sizes carefully, accounting for the different memory map and for DSi mode's interleaved memory, it is possible to overwrite part of Process9's stack and take control with a ROP chain.
 +
 +
Fixed in 11.8.0-X by... (fill me in)
 +
| ARM9 code execution (whilst still in 3DS mode)
 +
| [[11.8.0-41|11.8.0-X]]
 +
| [[11.8.0-41|11.8.0-X]]
 +
|
 +
| August 11, 2018
 +
| smea
 
|-
 
|-
 
| safefirmhax
 
| safefirmhax
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The fix for firmlaunch-hax was only applied to NATIVE_FIRM in [[9.5.0-22|9.5.0-X]], leaving SAFE_FIRM exploitable. With ARM11-kernel execution, one can trigger FIRM-launch in to SAFE_FIRM, do Kernel9 <=> Kernel11 sync, PXI sync and then repeat the original attack on SAFE_FIRM instead.
 
The fix for firmlaunch-hax was only applied to NATIVE_FIRM in [[9.5.0-22|9.5.0-X]], leaving SAFE_FIRM exploitable. With ARM11-kernel execution, one can trigger FIRM-launch in to SAFE_FIRM, do Kernel9 <=> Kernel11 sync, PXI sync and then repeat the original attack on SAFE_FIRM instead.
 
| ARM9 code execution
 
| ARM9 code execution
| None
+
| [[11.3.0-36|11.3.0-X]]
 
|  
 
|  
 
| 2012-2013?
 
| 2012-2013?
 
| Wiki: January 2, 2017
 
| Wiki: January 2, 2017
 +
| Everyone
 +
|-
 +
| safefirmhax 1.1
 +
| Nintendo's original safefirmhax fix was flawed -- they added a global boolean that got set to true whenever a non-sysmodule title got launched (except for a hardcoded repair title id), and panic()'d if that boolean was true to prevent launching safefirm after hax was active. However, because the boolean was initially false after firmlaunch -- With ARM11-kernel execution, one could FIRM-launch into NATIVE_FIRM, and then immediately FIRM-launch again into SAFE_FIRM early in NATIVE_FIRM boot before the boolean got set to true to repeat the safehax attack.
 +
 +
This was fixed by adding additional CFG9_BOOTENV checks to firmlaunch code in 11.4.
 +
| ARM9 code execution
 +
| [[11.4.0-37|11.4.0-X]]
 +
|
 +
| safefirmhax fix
 +
| Wiki: April 10, 2017
 
| Everyone
 
| Everyone
 
|-
 
|-
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|  
 
|  
 
| ?
 
| ?
 +
|-
 +
| Anti-downgrade list did not include all system titles initially
 +
| The anti-downgrade list did not include legacy FIRMs until [[11.8.0-41|11.8.0-X]]. Therefore, legacy FIRMs could still be downgraded.
 +
| Downgrading legacy FIRMs; allowing to exploit bugs in older legacy FIRMs (of which at least one exists, see below).
 +
| [[11.8.0-33|11.8.0]]
 +
| [[11.8.0-33|11.8.0]]
 +
| ?
 +
| Wiki: August 5, 2018
 +
| Everyone
 +
|-
 +
| TWL_FIRM cmd-9 unchecked offset
 +
| In [[1.0.0-0|1.0.0-X]]'s TWL_FIRM, cmds 8 and 9 were not stubbed (whereas in the corresponding NATIVE_FIRM, they were).
 +
Command 8 does the Process9 initialisation for NTR carts if an NTR cart is inserted (NTR, not TWL, judged by chipid).
 +
 +
Command 9 takes (u32 offset_read, u32 offset_write, u32 offset_read_end), and basically just copies (offset_read_end - offset_read) bytes starting at (offset_read) of [NTR cart header in arm9mem, NTR secure area in fcram, TWL secure area in fcram], to 0x18001000 + offset_write + offset_read.
 +
 +
offset_write is not checked at all, thus this leads to ARM9 code execution as long as any NTR cart, including flashcarts that would normally be blocked by TWL_FIRM, is inserted.
 +
 +
In [[2.0.0-2|2.0.0-X]] TWL_FIRM, those commands were stubbed out.
 +
| ARM9 code execution
 +
| [[2.0.0-2|2.0.0-X]]
 +
| [[2.0.0-2|2.0.0-X]]
 +
| January 2018
 +
| Wiki: August 5, 2018
 +
| [[User:Riley|Riley]]
 +
|-
 +
| FIRM launch doesn't check target FIRM version
 +
| When executing a FIRM launch, Process9 doesn't validate that the target FIRM isn't an old version.  This allows booting an exploitable FIRM from a newer FIRM, if you can get the exploitable FIRM installed.  ([[11.0.0-33|11.0.0-X]] now prevents installing old versions of system titles, but this doesn't affect titles already installed.)
 +
 +
This had a use after [[9.6.0-24|9.6.0-X]]: on a compromised 3DS running 9.2.0, you could install the 9.6.0 NATIVE_FIRM to FIRM0/FIRM1, but avoid putting it into the NATIVE_FIRM title.  This would boot the 9.2.0 system software but with the 9.6.0 Process9 and Kernel11.  With a user-mode exploit in a sufficiently-privileged application (e.g. mset), you could trigger a FIRM launch back to NATIVE_FIRM, which would load the 9.2.0 Process9 and Kernel11.
 +
 +
9.6.0's keyslots 0x15 and 0x16 are unknown to 9.2.0, so 9.2.0 would not clear them.  You then could do firmlaunchhax against 9.2.0 to get ARM9 access with keyslots 0x15 and 0x16 set to their proper 9.6.0 values, allowing decrypting 9.6.0's encrypted titles.  Once the New3DS keystore was dumped, this became moot.
 +
| Decrypting 9.6.0 NCCH files without dumping New3DS keystore
 +
| None (but now moot)
 +
| [[9.6.0-24|9.6.0-X]]
 +
| March 2015
 +
| August 12, 2018
 +
| [[User:Yellows8|Yellows8]], [[User:Myria|Myria]]
 
|-
 
|-
 
| FAT FS code null-deref
 
| FAT FS code null-deref
Line 319: Line 452:  
| See description.
 
| See description.
 
| None
 
| None
| [[11.2.0-35|11.2.0-X]]
+
| [[11.3.0-36|11.3.0-X]]
 
| March 15, 2015
 
| March 15, 2015
 
| December 29, 2015
 
| December 29, 2015
Line 329: Line 462:  
| Reusing the previously used keyslot, for crypto with PS.
 
| Reusing the previously used keyslot, for crypto with PS.
 
| None
 
| None
| [[11.2.0-35|11.2.0-X]]
+
| [[11.3.0-36|11.3.0-X]]
 
| Roughly the same time(same day?) as firmlaunch-hax.
 
| Roughly the same time(same day?) as firmlaunch-hax.
 
| December 29, 2015
 
| December 29, 2015
Line 377: Line 510:  
| [[DSiWare_Exports]] [[CTCert]] verification
 
| [[DSiWare_Exports]] [[CTCert]] verification
 
| Just like DSi originally did, 3DS verifies the APCert for DSiWare on SD with the CTCert also in the DSiWare .bin. On DSi this was fixed with with system-version 1.4.2 by verifying with the actual console-unique cert instead(stored in NAND), while on 3DS it's still not(?) fixed.
 
| Just like DSi originally did, 3DS verifies the APCert for DSiWare on SD with the CTCert also in the DSiWare .bin. On DSi this was fixed with with system-version 1.4.2 by verifying with the actual console-unique cert instead(stored in NAND), while on 3DS it's still not(?) fixed.
On 3DS however this is rather useless, due to the entire DSiWare .bin being encrypted with the console-unique movable.sed keyY.
+
On 3DS however this is useless, unless one can obtain the console-unique movable.sed keyY which encrypts the entire DSiWare .bin.
 
| When the movable.sed keyY for the target 3DS is known and the target 3DS CTCert private-key is unknown, importing of modified DSiWare SD .bin files.
 
| When the movable.sed keyY for the target 3DS is known and the target 3DS CTCert private-key is unknown, importing of modified DSiWare SD .bin files.
| Unknown, probably none.
+
| None.
| ?
+
| 11.8.0-X
 
| April 2013
 
| April 2013
 
|  
 
|  
 
| [[User:Yellows8|Yellows8]]
 
| [[User:Yellows8|Yellows8]]
 +
|-
 +
| seedminer: movable.sed keyY vulnerable to brute-force
 +
| Half of the movable.sed keyY's 128 bits are leaked through the [[Nandrw/sys/LocalFriendCodeSeed_B|LFCS]], which is available in userland and below. The LFCS itself also leaks almost half of the remaining bits by following the ratio: u32 keyY[3]=1/5(LFCS). The remaining keyY[3] uncertainty of about ±2000 can be greatly reduced by plotting expected error margins with several keyYs. This results in a final uncertainty of about 2^40, easily within practical brute force range of an average modern PC.
 +
| Knowing the keyY of a given 3ds allows for modification of DSiWare export contents, and chained with several other public vulns, ultimately arm9 execution.
 +
| None.
 +
| 11.8.0-X
 +
| December 2017
 +
| January 2018
 +
| zoogie
 +
|-
 +
| Improper validation of DSiWare title SRLs
 +
| The 3DS does not verify if the actual SRL embedded in the title's directory matches the titleID in the TMD before launching it or importing it from an sd DSiWare export.
 +
| This allows embedding older, exploitable DSiWare titles in completely different, unexploitable DSiWare titles. Since DSiWare has raw NAND RW, this can result in arm9 control through FIRM known-plaintext and sighax attacks.
 +
| None.
 +
| 11.8.0-X
 +
| 2015?
 +
| December 2016
 +
| Everyone
 +
|-
 +
| DSiWare import/export functions allow TWL system titles as arguments
 +
| AM ImportTwlBackup/ExportTwlBackup unnecessarily allow TWL system titles such as DS Download Play to import/export from userland and System Settings -> Data Management (only am:sys is needed for userland). This is difficult to abuse for dsihax injection because no TWL system title has a save file, and any import with a save included will result in FS err C8804464. However, there is at least one dsihax primary that can load a payload from a non-NAND source, and not error if it can't access its public.sav (JPN Flipnote Studio v0).
 +
| When combined with other public vulns, arm9 code execution.
 +
| None.
 +
| 11.8.0-X
 +
| May 2018
 +
| Sept 2018
 +
| zoogie
 
|-
 
|-
 
| [[Gamecard_Services_PXI]] unchecked REG_CTRCARDCNT transfer-size
 
| [[Gamecard_Services_PXI]] unchecked REG_CTRCARDCNT transfer-size
Line 445: Line 605:  
!  Discovered by
 
!  Discovered by
 
|-
 
|-
| [[CONFIG Registers#CFG_SYSPROT9|CFG_SYSPROT9]] bit1 not set by Kernel9
+
| [[CONFIG Registers#CFG9_SYSPROT9|CFG9_SYSPROT9]] bit1 not set by Kernel9
| Old versions of Kernel9 never set bit1 of [[CONFIG Registers#CFG_SYSPROT9|CFG_SYSPROT9]]. This leaves the [[OTP Registers|0x10012000]]-region unprotected (this region should be locked early during boot!). Since it's never locked, you can dump it once you get ARM9 code execution.
+
| Old versions of Kernel9 never set bit1 of [[CONFIG Registers#CFG9_SYSPROT9|CFG9_SYSPROT9]]. This leaves the [[OTP Registers|0x10012000]]-region unprotected (this region should be locked early during boot!). Since it's never locked, you can dump it once you get ARM9 code execution.
    
From [[3.0.0-5|3.0.0-X]] this was fixed by setting the bit in Kernel9 after poking some registers in that region. On New3DS arm9loader sets this bit instead of Kernel9, which is exploitable through a hardware + software vulnerability (see arm9loaderhax / description).
 
From [[3.0.0-5|3.0.0-X]] this was fixed by setting the bit in Kernel9 after poking some registers in that region. On New3DS arm9loader sets this bit instead of Kernel9, which is exploitable through a hardware + software vulnerability (see arm9loaderhax / description).
   −
This flaw resurged when it gained a new practical use: retrieving the OTP data for a New3DS console in order to decrypt the key data used in arm9loader (see enhanced-arm9loaderhax / description). This was performed by downgrading to a vulnerable system version. By accounting for differences in CTR-NAND crypto (0x05 -> 0x04, see partition encryption types [[Flash_Filesystem#NAND_structure|here]]), it is possible to boot a New3DS using Old3DS firmware 1.0-2.X and an Old3DS [[NCSD#NCSD_header|NCSD Header]] to retrieve the required OTP data using this flaw.
+
This flaw resurged when it gained a new practical use: retrieving the OTP data for a New3DS console in order to decrypt the key data used in arm9loader (see enhanced-arm9loaderhax / description). This was performed by downgrading to a vulnerable system version. By accounting for differences in CTR-NAND crypto (0x05 -> 0x04, see partition encryption types [[Flash_Filesystem#NAND_structure|here]]) and using an Old3DS [[NCSD#NCSD_header|NCSD Header]], it is possible to boot a New3DS using Old3DS firmware 1.0-2.x to retrieve the required OTP data using this flaw.
| Dumping of the [[OTP Registers|OTP]] area
+
| Dumping the [[OTP Registers|OTP]] area.
 +
Decrypting New3DS sector 0x96 keyblock.
 
| [[3.0.0-5|3.0.0-X]]
 
| [[3.0.0-5|3.0.0-X]]
 
|
 
|
Line 469: Line 630:  
!  Timeframe this was discovered
 
!  Timeframe this was discovered
 
!  Discovered by
 
!  Discovered by
 +
|-
 +
| [[SVC|svcSetProcessIdealProcessor]] reference count overflow and therefore use-after-free.
 +
| The SVC receive two arguments: handle and idealprocessor. The handle is used to get the KProcess object and the KProcess->refCnt gets incremented,later the function check if the KProcess->mem_type != BASE and if yes, it checks for idealprocessor == 2 or idealprocessor != 3. The problem here is that if you pass the idealprocessor = 3 it won't meet any condition and return the error 0xD9001BEA without decrement the reference count.
 +
It can be abused to overflow the KProcess reference count that will lead to an Use-after-free.
 +
| Before [[11.2.0-35|11.2.0-X]]: reference count overflow and therefore use-after-free.
 +
|
 +
| [[11.6.0-39|11.6.0-X]]
 +
| November 2, 2017
 +
| [[User:st4rk|st4rk]]
 +
|-
 +
| [[SVC|svcGetThreadList]] process reference leak
 +
| When given a valid process handle (including <code>0xFFFF8001</code>), svcGetThreadList forgets to decrement the reference count of the underlying [[KProcess]] instance, after having finished using it.
 +
| Before [[11.2.0-35|11.2.0-X]]: reference count overflow and therefore use-after-free, but this UAF was most likely not exploitable
 +
|
 +
| [[11.3.0-36|11.3.0-X]]
 +
| April 3, 2017
 +
| [[User:TuxSH|TuxSH]]
 +
|-
 +
| kernelhax via gspwn
 +
| Originally the kernel didn't initialize [[CONFIG11_Registers#CFG11_GPUPROT|CFG11_GPUPROT]]. Since it's 0 at hard-boot, this allowed the GPU to access the entire FCRAM + AXIWRAM.
 +
| Entire FCRAM+AXIWRAM R/W.
 +
| [[3.0.0-5|3.0.0-X]]
 +
|
 +
| February 7, 2017
 +
| [[User:Plutooo|plutoo]], [[User:Yellows8|Yellows8]] partly
 +
|-
 +
| fasthax
 +
| When a KTimer is created in pulse mode, the kernel calls a virtual function to reset the timer each time it pulses. The scheduler is locked for that core to avoid race conditions, but another core can call CloseHandle on the timer and free it, leading to a UAF vtable call.
 +
| See description.
 +
| [[11.3.0-36|11.3.0-X]]
 +
| [[11.3.0-36|11.3.0-X]]
 +
| May 2016
 +
| nedwill
 
|-
 
|-
 
| ipctakeover
 
| ipctakeover
Line 478: Line 672:  
| See description.
 
| See description.
 
| None
 
| None
| [[11.2.0-35|11.2.0-X]]
+
| [[11.3.0-36|11.3.0-X]]
 
| November 26, 2016
 
| November 26, 2016
 
| [[User:Yellows8|Yellows8]]
 
| [[User:Yellows8|Yellows8]]
Line 488: Line 682:  
| See description.
 
| See description.
 
| None
 
| None
| [[11.2.0-35|11.2.0-X]]
+
| [[11.3.0-36|11.3.0-X]]
 
| November 2016
 
| November 2016
 
| [[User:Yellows8|Yellows8]]
 
| [[User:Yellows8|Yellows8]]
Line 498: Line 692:  
|  
 
|  
 
|  None
 
|  None
| [[11.2.0-35|11.2.0-X]]
+
| [[11.3.0-36|11.3.0-X]]
 
| 2012
 
| 2012
 
| Everyone
 
| Everyone
Line 520: Line 714:  
| Access to all [[Services_API|services]], ControlMemory on any given mem-region.
 
| Access to all [[Services_API|services]], ControlMemory on any given mem-region.
 
| None
 
| None
| [[11.2.0-35|11.2.0-X]]
+
| [[11.3.0-36|11.3.0-X]]
 
| 2012 maybe?
 
| 2012 maybe?
 
|  
 
|  
Line 536: Line 730:  
|  
 
|  
 
| None
 
| None
| [[11.2.0-35|11.2.0-X]]
+
| [[11.3.0-36|11.3.0-X]]
 
|  
 
|  
 
|  
 
|  
Line 733: Line 927:  
| May 19(?)-20, 2015
 
| May 19(?)-20, 2015
 
| [[User:Yellows8|Yellows8]]
 
| [[User:Yellows8|Yellows8]]
 +
|-
 +
| [[SM]] out-of-bounds BSS write (table 1 entry too small)
 +
| After accepting a new session, [[SM]] writes a (handler ID (0 for srv: sessions (max. 64), 1 for the srv:pm one), pointer to session context structure in BSS) pair in a global array. However that array is only 64-entry-big instead of 65 (as it ought to be), and no bound check is done in that regard.
 +
 +
Unfortunately, as of [[11.4.0-37]], the overwritten fields are totally unused after their initialization by <code>__libc_init_array</code>.
 +
| Not currently exploitable
 +
| None
 +
| [[11.4.0-37]]
 +
|
 +
|
 
|}
 
|}
   Line 746: Line 950:  
!  Timeframe this was added to wiki
 
!  Timeframe this was added to wiki
 
!  Discovered by
 
!  Discovered by
 +
|-
 +
| [[Config_Services|CFG]]:CreateConfigInfoBlk integer underflow
 +
| When creating a new block it checks the size of the block is <= 0x8000, but it doesn't check that the block size is less than the remaining space. This induces an integer underflow (remaining_space-block_size), the result is then used for another check (buf_start+current_offset+constant <= remaining_space-block_size) and then in a mempcy call (dest = buf_start+(u16)(remaining_space-block_size), size =block_size). This allow for writing past the buffer, however because of the u16 cast in the memcpy call memory has to be mapped from buf_start to buf_start+0x10000 (cannot write backward).
 +
| Theoritically ROP under CFG services, but BSS section is to small (size <= 0x10000) so it only results in a crash.
 +
| None
 +
| [[11.8.0-41]]
 +
| November, 2018
 +
| November 24, 2018
 +
| [[User:Nba_Yoh|MrNbaYoh]]
 +
|-
 +
|-
 +
| [[MP:SendDataFrame]] missing input array index validation
 +
| [[MP:SendDataFrame]] doesn't validate the input index at cmdreq[1], unless the function for flag=non-zero is executed. This is used to calculate the following, without validating the index at all: someptr = stateptr + (index*0x924) + somestateoffset.
 +
 +
After validating some flags from someptr, when input_flag=0 the input buffer data is copied to someptr+someotheroffset+0x14 with the u16 size loaded from someptr+someotheroffset.
 +
 +
With a large input index someptr could be setup to be at a <target address>, for overwriting memory.
 +
 +
This is probably difficult to exploit.
 +
|
 +
| None
 +
| [[8.0.0-18]](MP-sysmodule v2048)
 +
| January 22, 2017
 +
| January 22, 2017
 +
| [[User:Yellows8|Yellows8]]
 +
|-
 +
| [[MP_Services|MP]] cmd1 out-of-bounds handle read
 +
| MP-sysmodule handles the input parameter for cmd1 as a s32. It checks for >=16, but not <0. With <16 it basically does the following(array of entries 4-bytes each): *outhandle = ((Handle*)(stateptr+offsetinstate))[inputindex].
 +
 +
Hence, this can be used to load any handle in MP-sysmodule memory. MP doesn't really have any service handles of interest however(can be obtained from elsewhere too).
 +
| Reading any handle in MP-sysmodule memory.
 +
| None
 +
| [[8.0.0-18]](MP-sysmodule v2048)
 +
| January 21, 2017
 +
| January 22, 2017
 +
| [[User:Yellows8|Yellows8]]
 
|-
 
|-
 
| AM stack/.bss infoleak via [[AM:ReadTwlBackupInfo]]([[AM:ReadTwlBackupInfoEx|Ex]])
 
| AM stack/.bss infoleak via [[AM:ReadTwlBackupInfo]]([[AM:ReadTwlBackupInfoEx|Ex]])
Line 780: Line 1,020:  
Besides CTRSDK memchunk-headers, there are no addresses stored under this sharedmem.
 
Besides CTRSDK memchunk-headers, there are no addresses stored under this sharedmem.
 
| ROP under NWM-module.
 
| ROP under NWM-module.
| None
+
| [[11.4.0-37|11.4.0-X]]
 
| [[9.0.0-20|9.0.0-X]]
 
| [[9.0.0-20|9.0.0-X]]
 
| April 10, 2016
 
| April 10, 2016
Line 829: Line 1,069:  
This is exploited by [https://github.com/yellows8/ctr-httpwn/ctr-httpwn ctr-httpwn].
 
This is exploited by [https://github.com/yellows8/ctr-httpwn/ctr-httpwn ctr-httpwn].
 
| ROP under HTTP sysmdule.
 
| ROP under HTTP sysmdule.
| None
+
| [[11.4.0-37|11.4.0-X]]
 
| [[9.6.0-24|9.6.0-X]] (Latest sysmodule version as of [[10.7.0-32|10.7.0-32]])
 
| [[9.6.0-24|9.6.0-X]] (Latest sysmodule version as of [[10.7.0-32|10.7.0-32]])
 
| Late 2015
 
| Late 2015
Line 902: Line 1,142:  
| GSP module does not validate addresses given to the GPU. This allows a user-mode application/applet to read/write to a large part of physical FCRAM using GPU DMA. From this, you can overwrite the .text segment of the application you're running under, and gain real code-execution from a ROP-chain. Normally applets' .text([[Home Menu]], [[Internet Browser]], etc) is located beyond the area accessible by the GPU, except for [[RO_Services|CROs]] used by applets([[Internet Browser]] for example).
 
| GSP module does not validate addresses given to the GPU. This allows a user-mode application/applet to read/write to a large part of physical FCRAM using GPU DMA. From this, you can overwrite the .text segment of the application you're running under, and gain real code-execution from a ROP-chain. Normally applets' .text([[Home Menu]], [[Internet Browser]], etc) is located beyond the area accessible by the GPU, except for [[RO_Services|CROs]] used by applets([[Internet Browser]] for example).
   −
FCRAM is gpu-accessible up to physaddr 0x26800000 on Old3DS, and 0x2DC00000 on New3DS. This is BASE_memregion_start(aka SYSTEM_memregion_end)-0x400000 with the default memory-layout on Old3DS/New3DS.
+
FCRAM is gpu-accessible up to physaddr 0x26800000 on Old3DS, and 0x2D800000 on New3DS. This is BASE_memregion_start(aka SYSTEM_memregion_end)-0x400000 (0x800000 with New3DS) with the default memory-layout on Old3DS/New3DS. With [[11.3.0-36|11.3.0-X]] the cutoff now varies due to the new [[SVC]] 0x59. The New3DS "normal"(non-APPLICATION) cutoff was changed to 0x2D000000 due to the new [[SVC]] 0x59.
 
| User-mode code execution.
 
| User-mode code execution.
 
| None
 
| None
48

edits